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Abstract 
 
I approach the state of global currency issues by identifying eight concepts that I see as having recently 
“peaked” and eight more that I see as currently rising in relevance.  Those that I see as having already seen 
their best days are: the G-7, global savings glut, corners hypothesis, proliferating currency unions, inflation 
targeting (narrowly defined), exorbitant privilege, Bretton Woods II, and currency manipulation.   Those 
that I see as receiving increased emphasis in the future are:  the G-20, the IMF, SDR, credit cycle, reserves, 
intermediate exchange rate regimes, commodity currencies, and multiple international currency system. 
 
 
 
In International Monetary Economics our exam questions remain the same over 
time.  Only the answers change, from decade to decade.    Although it may violate our 
self-image as scientists, it is hard to deny that our field has an element of cycles and fads  
that one associates more often with the financial world or even the fashion world.    
Currency boards were as popular in the 1990s as they were unknown ten years earlier.   
And so, with apologies, this lecture is structured in terms of “What’s Hot” and “What’s 
Not.”  Specifically, I am nominating  eight concepts, all of which were virtually 
conventional wisdom a short time ago, for my list of what is now “Out.”    Then I 
nominate eight concepts, which might generally be described as having been “out” a few 
years ago, for my list of what is now “In”. 
 
We take first the list that I choose to designate as “Out.”   In some cases, I am 
tolling the bell for an idea that has recently died.  In others, I am attempting an avant-
garde prediction of what the next few years might bring, without necessarily expecting 
others to agree.  
 
Part I:  What’s “Out”? 
 
1.  The G-7. 
The G-7 (Group of Seven) world leaders first met to ratify the de facto move to 
floating rates at Rambouillet, France, in 1975.  G-7 finance ministers cooperated 
to bring down a stratospheric dollar in 1985 and then again to halt the dollar’s 
depreciation in 1987, in agreements that were generally associated with the Plaza Hotel and Louvre, respectively.
1    With these events, the G-7 became the most 
important steering group of the world monetary system.   But the membership 
became increasingly anachronistic.  The addition of Russia to the G-8 leaders 
group was much too little, and also too late.   The failure to incorporate China and 
other major developing or emerging market countries has now rendered the G-7 
out-of-date.   What can finance ministers hope to accomplish by discussing the 
currency of a country that is not at the table? 
 
2.  Global saving glut 
From 2001 to 2008 economists carried on a debate under the name of “Global 
Current Account Imbalances.”     
 
a.  On one side of the debate were those who argued that US current account 
deficits had their origins domestically (in low national saving rates), were 
unsustainable, and would eventually bring about an abrupt depreciation of 
the dollar  (Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa, 2006; Chinn, 2005; Obstfeld-
Rogoff , 2001, 2005; Feldstein, 2007;  Frankel  2007b; Roubini, 2004; 
Summers, 2004…).       
b.  On the other side were a host of counterarguments.   They tended to take 
off from the starting point that it “takes two to tango;”  decisions by 
foreigners to invest in the US are as much a part of the story as US 
decisions to borrow.       One of the counterarguments was that the current 
account imbalances had their origin in a glut of saving in Asia and other 
foreign countries.    The proponents of the saving glut hypothesis pointed 
to low real interest rates, which admittedly needed explaining (Bernanke, 
2005; Clarida, 2005).  The opponents of the hypothesis pointed out that 
global saving had not in fact risen, at least as reflected in the statistics.     
(Some of the other counterarguments to the sustainability view are 
discussed below, under the rubrics of exorbitant privilege and Bretton 
Woods II.
2) 
c.  The crisis of 2007-2009 has not resolved the debate.   The reaction of the 
first side is that this is the crisis they were warning of.   The response of 
the second side is the savings glut caused the crisis.    
d.  Regardless who is right about the last 8 years, it is perhaps easier to make 
a prediction regarding the next 8 years:  national saving will fall globally.   
In the short run, governments are responding to the most severe recession 
in 70 years by increasing their budget deficits.   In the long run, the 
spending needs created by the increased retired population and rising 
medical costs will continue to reduce saving, both public and private.  In 
response, long-term real interest rates should rise, from the recent low 
levels.  On these grounds, I declare the savings glut dead. 
                                                 
1 Several qualifications:   First, concerted sales of the dollar in the foreign exchange market dated from 
January of 1985, 9 months before the Plaza.   Second, the Plaza club included only the G-5.    Third, the G-
7 attempt at the Louvre to put a floor under the dollar failed, and only a subsequent attempt later in 1987 
apparently succeeded.   Dominguez and Frankel (1993, pp. 11-18) . 
2  Frankel (2007b).   I count eight distinct lines of attacks on the unsustainability hypothesis.  
3.  Corners Hypothesis 
Perhaps by now the demise of the corners hypothesis is widely known.  If not, it 
might be because of its use of various aliases:   bipolarity, the missing middle… 
a.  The corners hypothesis was the proposition that countries are—or should 
be—moving to the corner solutions in their choice of exchange rate 
regimes. They were said to be opting either, on the one hand, for full 
flexibility, or, on the other hand, for rigid institutional commitments to 
fixed exchange rates, in the form of currency boards or full monetary 
union with the dollar or euro. It was said that the intermediate exchange 
rate regimes were no longer feasible. They were to go the way of the 
dinosaurs. A corollary of this theory was that the number of independent 
currencies in the world was declining, as 185 currencies consolidated in a 
much smaller number of big currency blocs. 
b.  The earliest known explicit reference to the corners hypothesis is by 
Eichengreen (1994).  
i.  The context was not emerging markets, but rather the European 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM). In the ERM crisis of 1992-1993, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, and others were forced to devalue or 
drop out altogether, and the bands had been subsequently widened 
substantially so that France could stay in. This crisis suggested to 
some that the strategy that had been planned previously—a gradual 
transition to the EMU, where the width of the target zone was 
narrowed in a few steps—might not be the best way to proceed 
after all. Crockett (1994) made the same point. Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995) concluded, “A careful examination of the genesis of 
speculative attacks suggests that even broad-band systems in the 
current EMS style pose difficulties, and that there is little, if any, 
comfortable middle ground between floating rates and the adoption 
by countries of a common currency.” The lesson that “the best way 
to cross a chasm is in a single jump” was seemingly borne out 
subsequently, when the leap from wide bands to EMU proved 
successful in 1998–1999. 
ii.  After the East Asia crises of 1997–1998, the hypothesis of the 
vanishing intermediate regime was applied to emerging markets. In 
the effort to “reform the financial architecture” so as to minimize 
the frequency and severity of crises in the future, the proposition 
was rapidly adopted by the financial establishment as the new 
conventional wisdom. 
iii.  For example, Summers (1999): 
“There is no single answer, but in light of recent experience what is perhaps becoming 
increasingly clear—and will probably be increasingly reflected in the advice that the 
international community offers—is that in a world of freely flowing capital there is 
shrinking scope for countries to occupy the middle ground of fixed but adjustable pegs. As 
we go forward from the events of the past eighteen months, I expect that countries will be 
increasingly wary about committing themselves to fixed exchange rates, whatever the 
temptations these may offer in the short run, unless they are also prepared to dedicate policy 
wholeheartedly to their support and establish extra-ordinary domestic safeguards to keep 
them in place.”  iv.  Other high-profile examples include Eichengreen (1999, p.104-
105), Fischer (2001) Minton-Beddoes (1999), and Council on 
Foreign Relations (1999, p.87). The G-7 Finance Ministers [them 
again!] agreed that the IMF should not in the future bail out 
countries that get into trouble by following an intermediate regime, 
though it qualified the scope of the generalization a bit, for 
example, by allowing a possible exception for “systemically” 
important countries.   
v.  It is not only the international financial establishment that decided 
intermediate regimes were nonviable. The Meltzer report, 
commissioned by the US Congress to recommend fundamental 
reform of international financial institutions, adopted the 
proposition as well:  “The Commission recommends that …the 
IMF should use its policy consultations to recommend either 
firmly fixed rates (currency board, dollarization) or fluctuating 
rates” (Meltzer 2000, p.8).  The Economist (1999, p.15-16) was 
thus probably right when it wrote that “Most academics now 
believe that only radical solutions will work: either currencies must 
float freely, or they must be tightly tied (through a currency board 
or, even better, currency unions).”   
c.  The proposition was never properly demonstrated, however, either 
theoretically or empirically.   The collapse of Argentina’s convertibility 
plan in 2001 probably marked the beginning of the end.  Today, it is clear 
that most countries continue to occupy the vast expanse in between 
floating on the one hand and rigid institutional pegs on the other hand, and 
it is much less common that one hears that intermediate regimes are a bad 
choice generically.
3 
 
4.  Proliferating currency unions 
The successful attainment of European Monetary Union ten years ago was truly 
historic.  In many ways, the skeptics (especially American economists) were 
proven wrong.  The January 1999 disappearance of 11 national currencies took 
place without a hitch and the first five eastward additions also went smoothly.  
After some early bumps, the euro established a reputation for strength and the 
ECB established a reputation for rectitude – with members of the board voting in 
what they see as the European best interest rather than for national constituencies. 
In some other parts of the world, dormant regional solidarity movements perked 
up.     
a.  Inspired in large part by the European example, monetary integration  was 
actively discussed in such areas as East Asia, the Gulf, and Africa 
(especially within West, Southern, and East Africa, respectively).  The 
Gulf Cooperation Council set a date of 2010 for adoption of a common 
                                                 
3 Every year I give a lecture on exchange rate regimes at the IMF Institute.    Ten years ago, when I polled 
the attending IMF staff, a majority said they considered the corners hypothesis to be conventional wisdom 
at the IMF.    In the years since then, the vote count has steadily declined.   Now none of the audience 
believes that it is conventional wisdom in their institution. currency.  The perceived proliferation of currency unions was one 
component of the aforementioned corners hypothesis. 
b.  Now, just as EMU has celebrated its 10th birthday, the bloom is off the 
rose.   In euroland, some of the drawbacks that the skeptics had warned 
about have recently come true after all.    First, the Stability and Growth 
Pact proved utterly unenforceable.   Second, forcing Dublin to have the 
same interest rate as Frankfurt has proven difficult indeed.   (Perhaps 
“asymmetric shocks,” belongs on the list of “What’s In”.)   Excessively 
easy monetary policy helped carry Ireland from Celtic Tiger to real estate 
bubble, and arguably is the direct cause of the severe recession that the 
country is now experiencing.    Third, Central and Eastern Europe has 
been the worst hit by the recent international crisis. 
c.  Whether one scores the promotion of intra-euroland trade as a “plus” or a 
“minus” for the euro depends on one’s reference point.  On the one hand, 
econometric estimates like those reported in Table 1 show a significant  
effect of 15% over the first 8 years of the euro (and with no trade 
diversion) -- a better outcome than would have been expected before 1999.   
On the other hand, these estimates fall far short of the doubling or tripling 
found in data from earlier smaller currency unions in Rose (2000) and 
successor papers.
4 
d.  Meanwhile, the proposals for monetary integrations in other regions have 
gone nowhere.  The one that seemed most on track, in the Gulf, survived 
the blows of an Omani demurral and Kuwaiti revaluation, but could not 
withstand the direct hit by the United Arab Emirates when it withdrew in 
May 2008.  It may be some time before the world sees another new 
currency union. 
                                                 
4 In Frankel (2009) I present updated estimates of the euro’s trade effect, list three hypotheses to explain the 
gap, and present evidence against each of the three.   In other words, the gap remains a mystery.   3
Effect becomes
significant in 1999
Reaches 16% in 2001
Steady through 2006
Table 1 --
 
Source: Frankel (2009a) 
 
5.  Inflation targeting (narrowly defined) 
By the 1970s, two equations had come to dominate monetary theory.  One was the 
supply relationship connecting output (relative to potential) and inflation (relative to 
expectations).   The other was the money market equilibrium condition, connecting 
the money supply to the price level.   To be sure, many Ph.D.s and tenure promotions 
were earned by derivation of such equations from intertemporal optimization, but for 
quite awhile the bottom line did not change. 
a.  An implication of the expected inflation term in the supply relationship 
was that governments could attain lower inflation, without output cost, if 
the anti-inflationary credibility of central banks was assured by 
commitment to a nominal anchor.   But what choice for nominal anchor?   
At the beginning of the 1980s, the money supply became the anchor of 
choice, at least for the world’s most important central banks [Fed, 
Bundesbank, Bank of Japan, and Bank of England], in their efforts to 
disinflate.   But large velocity shifts soon discredited this choice.
5    
b.  By the time developing countries were ready to disinflate, the exchange 
rate was the anchor of choice, with Argentina in 1991 traveling the longest 
                                                 
5 Even Milton Friedman, before he passed away, admitted that the money demand function had proven too 
unstable to rely on as the bedrock of monetary policy. distance, from hyperinflation to quasi-currency-board.   By the end of the 
1990s, however, exchange rate targeting for medium-sized countries had 
in turn become discredited, by the currency crises in Mexico (1994), East 
Asia (1997-98), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), Argentina (2001) and 
Turkey (2002).   For one thing, holding the economy hostage to the dollar 
during a period when the dollar appreciated strongly was as difficult as 
holding the economy hostage to M1 when the demand for money had 
increased in the 1980s [or hostage to gold in the 19
th century].    If the 
1980s were the decade of M1 and the 1990s were the decade of the 
exchange rate peg, then this past ten years has been the decade of inflation 
targeting.
6   
c.  Inflation targeting narrowly defined would have central banks committing 
to annual inflation targets and being judged solely by their ability to hit 
those targets.  “Flexible inflation targeting” allows central banks to target 
output, in addition to inflation.    Indeed John Taylor and Michael 
Woodford, in reaction to the instability of money demand, wrote the 
money supply out of the play altogether.  The Taylor Rule told central 
banks to set the interest rate directly in response to output and inflation.   
So far as I know, however, virtually all forms of inflation targeting tell 
central banks to focus on the CPI.  The orthodoxy says: 
i.  Pay no attention to asset prices, except to the extent it foretells 
future inflation,  and  
ii.  Pay no attention to the exchange rate, except to the extent that it 
foretells future inflation.     The CPI focus also says not to 
accommodate terms of trade shocks:   
iii.  Pay no attention to export prices, except to the extent these goods 
are also consumed. Producers of oil or other minerals, for example, 
should pay little attention to the world price of their commodity.  If 
dollar oil prices go up, as they did during much of the decade, the 
oil producing countries should not allow the improvement in their 
terms of trade to show up as an appreciation of their currency, for 
this would put downward pressure on their CPI.  If oil prices fall, 
as at the end of 2008 [or in 19997-98], they should not allow the 
worsening of their terms of trade to show up as a depreciation, for 
this would put upward pressure on the CPI.    
iv.  If interpreted literally, CPI targeting also tells central banks to fight 
supply shocks.  Pay no attention to fluctuations in world prices of 
your imports.   It tells oil importers, for example, that if dollar oil 
prices go up by X%, they should contract monetarily so as to 
appreciate the currency by the same X%; anything less will result 
in higher local-currency oil prices and thus a higher CPI     If dollar 
oil prices go down by Y%, they should expand monetarily so as to 
depreciate the currency by the same Y%; anything less will result 
in lower oil prices and thus a lower CPI.     
                                                 
6 Among many references, three of the internationally prominent ones are: Svensson (1995), Bernanke, 
Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999); and Truman (2003). v.  This advice to appreciate in response to negative terms of trade 
shocks and depreciate in response to positive terms of trade shocks 
is the opposite of textbook common sense.    Admittedly, terms of 
trade shocks are far less important for large countries such as the 
US or euroland than for small open commodity-producers.    
Admittedly, too, proponents of inflation targeting almost never 
want to target the “headline CPI;”   they admit the need for an 
escape clause, either ex ante or ex post.   But this undercuts the 
purpose of a transparent nominal anchor. 
d.  Why is inflation targeting on my list of concepts that are slated for the dust 
heap?   This cavalier-sounding dismissal of conventional wisdeom is 
probably the most controversial of my claims.   I have three reasons for it.    
i.  First, the injunction to pay no attention to the exchange rate is one 
that none but a dozen or so committed floaters have been able to 
live by.    Calvo and Reinhart (2002) coined “fear of floating” to 
capture that most countries that say they float, don’t really.   Rather 
they feel the need to intervene to moderate fluctuations in the 
demand for their currencies.   Declared inflation targeters do this 
even when there is no threat to the CPI.   It’s not just that the 
variability of reserves is substantially greater than zero for those 
who say they float, in the way that the variability of exchange rates 
of those who say they peg is substantially greater than zero.  The 
amazing finding of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) is that the 
variability of reserves/ relative to the variability of exchange rates 
is generally no smaller for self-declared “floaters” than for 
supposed “fixers”! 
ii.  Second, although most monetary economists ten years ago went 
along with Alan Greenspan’s doctrine that it is hopeless to try to 
identify and prick speculative bubbles in stock markets and real 
estate markets while they are in progress, and that cutting interest 
rates after they crash is enough to protect the economy, recent 
experience has changed a lot of minds.     
iii.  Third, choosing the CPI as the price index of interest is needlessly 
destabilizing to the international accounts for countries where 
terms of trade shocks are important.    An alternative price index 
such as the PPI or an index of export prices would more 
appropriately accommodate fluctuations in the terms of trade.   
[more below] 
  
6.  Exorbitant privilege 
Among those who have argued that the US current account deficit can be 
sustained without a major depreciation of the dollar, besides the savings-glutters, 
are various proponents of the view that the US will continue to enjoy the unique 
privilege of being able to borrow virtually unlimited amounts in its own currency.    
a.  When does this “privilege” warrant the label “exorbitant?”  Presumably 
the privilege is exorbitant if it accrues to the United States solely because of size and/or history, without the country having done anything to earn 
the benefit through virtuous policies such as budget discipline, price 
stability, and a stable exchange rate.   Since the 1970s, the United States 
has racked up $10 trillion in debt and the dollar has experienced a long-
term loss in value compared to other international currencies such as the 
yen, Swiss franc, and deutschemark/euro:  between January 1973 and May 
2009 it depreciated 30% against an index of major currencies.
7    It seems 
unlikely that macroeconomic policy discipline is what has earned the 
United States its privilege. 
b.  Some argue that the privilege to incur dollar liabilities has been earned in 
a different way:  The United States has been appropriately exploiting its 
comparative advantage in supplying high-quality assets to the rest of the 
world.  Recent examples include Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas;
8  Cline;  
Cooper (2005); Forbes (2008); Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006a, 
2006b);  Ju and Wei (2008) and Mendoza, Quadrini, and  Rios-Rull 
(2007a, b).    In one version, the United States has been operating as the 
World’s Banker or the World’s Venture Capitalist, accepting short-term 
liquid deposits and making long-term or risky investments (Gourinchas 
and Rey).   Recurrent upward revaluations in the dollar price of US 
overseas assets have in effect financed much of the US deficits;
9  some 
believe that the valuation effects are not an unsustainable coincidence, but 
rather a component of the sustainable returns that the United States enjoys 
as world banker.  
c.  As noted under sub-section 2 above, the recent financial crisis has done 
little to resolve the debate over the fundamental causes of the US current 
account deficit.  The argument that the United States supplies assets of 
superior quality, and thereby has earned the right to issue dollars to the 
rest of the world and finance its deficits, would seem to be undermined by 
disfunctionality that the US financial crisis suddenly revealed in 2007-08.     
American financial institutions broadly defined have suffered a severe loss 
of credibility (corporate governance, accounting standards, rating 
agencies, derivatives, etc.), while American financial institutions defined 
as banks and non-banks have in many cases ceased to operate (at least as 
private entities).   How could sub-prime mortgages, CDOs, and CDSs be 
the superior type of assets that uniquely merit the respect of the world’s 
investors? 
d.  But the events of the last year have undermined the opposing 
interpretation, the unsustainability position, as well.    If this is the crisis of 
which the doomsayers have been warning, then why did the dollar not 
suffer the long-feared hard landing?   The dollar, in fact, appreciated 
strongly after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and interest rates on US 
treasury securities went very low.  Clearly in 2008 the world still viewed 
the US Treasury bill market as a safe haven and the US dollar as the 
                                                 
7 Federal Reserve Board Release H10, Major Currencies Index. 
8 Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008):  “Intermediation rents…pay for the trade deficits.” 
9 Lane and Milesi Feretti (2007) and  Devereux and Sutherland (2009).  premier international currency.   Although the more exotic arguments 
about the uniquely high quality of US private assets have been tarnished, 
the basic idea of American exorbitant privilege is still alive:   the dollar is 
the world’s reserve currency, by virtue of U.S. size and history. 
e.  The question then becomes whether the dollar’s unique role is an eternal 
god-given constant, or whether a sufficiently long record of deficits and 
depreciation could induce investors to turn elsewhere.    In the early 1990s 
there was talk of the dollar losing its place as unrivaled international 
currency.   The facts at that time did not support it.    Neither the yen nor 
the deutschemark was a plausible rival, because Japan and Germany were 
not big enough, and Tokyo and Frankfurt were insufficiently developed as 
financial centers.   But now there is a plausible rival, the euro.    
f.  Consider the list of determinants of reserve currency status:  economic 
size, depth of financial markets, rate of return, and the inertia of history.  
Euroland, is approximately the size of the United States.    It is true that 
Frankfurt still lags behind New York in the depth and liquidity of its 
financial markets, but there are two counterarguments: (i) one should 
perhaps count London as the true financial center of the euro rather than 
Frankfurt, and (ii) the credibility of US financial markets as limitless deep, 
liquid, and trustworthy has been seriously impaired by the crisis.   (Of 
course, that is also true of London.)     
g.  Counting most heavily against the dollar, it has shown a poor ability to 
keep its value over time, whether measured by the level or volatility of the 
exchange rate.   Counting most heavily in its favor is the inertia of history.  
These things don’t change quickly.  But eventually a tipping point is 
reached.   The precedent, of course, is when pound sterling was overtaken 
by the dollar (between 1931 and 1945, depending on one’s viewpoint), 
which happened with a substantial lag after the determinants had change 
(between 1872 and 1917, again depending on the measure), but which 
worked quickly when it happened. 
h.  Menzie Chinn and I (2007, 2008) have econometrically estimated the 
effects of these various determinants on holdings of reserves by central 
banks.   The estimated weight on the lagged value of reserves, reported in 
Table 1, suggests that the estimated speed of adjustment is about 1/10 per 
year.    We then simulated what is likely to happen in the future.   We find 
that a tipping point, where the euro pulls ahead of the dollar, could come 
as early as 2022 or even 2015 (Figure 1).  
Table 2: Determinants of Reserve Currency Shares (logit form)  
Pre-EMU Panel Regression, 1973-1998 (182 observations) 
  Coefficient estimates  Standard errors 
GDP ratio (y)  0.115  [0.049] 
    
Inflation diff (π)  -0.143  [0.063] 
    
Exrate var (σ)  -0.055  [0.032] 
     
Fx turnover ratio (to) 0.023  [0.016] 
    
GDP leader   0.026  [0.014] 
    
lagshare (sh t-1)  0.904  [.029] 
    
Adj R2  0.99    
Source: Chinn and Frankel (2007).    Notes: Dependent variable is sh. Estimated using OLS, no constant. All variables are in 
decimal form.  GDP at market terms. Figures in bold face are significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Central bank reserve holdings 
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 7.  Bretton Woods II 
The view of Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003) on current account 
imbalances has received a lot of attention.  They begin, perceptively enough, with the 
observation that today’s system is a new Bretton Woods, with Asia playing the role 
that Europe played in the 1960s—buying up lots of dollars to prevent their own 
currencies from appreciating. Then the authors go on to some more original and 
provocative ideas: China is piling up dollars not because of myopic mercantilism, but 
as part of an export-led development strategy that is rational given China’s need to 
import workable systems of finance and corporate governance. 
a.  Initially, they were understood to be saying that this system could continue 
indefinitely. More recently, they have been pinned down as claiming only 
that it can go on for 10 or 15 years, comparable to the life of the Bretton 
Woods system.
10  
b.  My own view is that the Bretton Woods analogy is apt, but we are closer 
to 1971 (the date of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system) than to 
1944 (the date of the actual meeting at Bretton Woods, NH) or 1958 
(when currency convertibility was first restored in Europe). The current 
situation is more like the 1960s than Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 
had in mind. It could have taken decades after 1958 for the Triffin 
dilemma to work itself out. But the Johnson and Nixon administrations 
greatly accelerated the process by expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies (driven by the Vietnam War and Arthur Burns, respectively). 
These policies produced a declining trade balance and overall balance of 
payments, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, and the 
failure of the attempted patch in 1973. There is no reason to expect better 
today. First, capital mobility is much higher now than in the 1960s. 
Second the United States can no longer necessarily rely on support of the 
foreign creditor central banks—neither on economic grounds (they are not 
now as they were then organized into a cooperative framework where each 
agrees explicitly to hold dollars if the others do), nor on political grounds 
(these creditors are not the staunch allies that the United States had in the 
1960s).   
 
8.  Currency manipulation 
In 2007, the IMF was supposedly given responsibility for surveillance over 
members’ exchange rates, by which the US meant telling China that the value of 
its currency was below the appropriate.   The phrase “unfair currency 
manipulation” has had official status in US law for 20 years and in the IMF 
Articles of Agreement for longer despite its protectionist ring.   In practice, the 
supposed injunction on surplus countries to revalue upward has almost never been 
enforced, in contrast to the pressure on deficit countries to devalue.   Some would 
say it is time to rectify the asymmetry.
11    My view is that it is time to recognize 
two realities:   (1) It is normally not possible to say with confidence what is the 
correct value of a currency (and still less what is the “fair” value).  (2) Creditors 
                                                 
10 Dooley and Garber (2005). 
11 E.g., Goldstein (2003, 2004, 2007). are, and will always be, in a stronger power position than debtors.  It is time to 
retire the language of unfair currency manipulation, rather than diluting the 
legitimacy of the language of international trade agreements.  
a.  American Congressmen of both parties have since 2003 argued that the 
RMB is undervalued and that increased flexibility in China’s currency 
regime would be beneficial.   These are both reasonable propositions.  But 
the politicians have grossly overestimated the importance of the issue.    
They were misguided in thinking that an appreciation of the RMB would, 
alone, do much to boost US output or employment.  The demands were 
especially misguided in putting such high priority on the entire exchange 
rate issue, given that we need China’s help on more important things, such 
as preventing a nuclear-armed North Korea.   But my arguments during 
this period might have been viewed by non-wonks as quibbles.   After all, 
I did agree that an increase in the flexibility of China’s exchange rate 
would be a good thing. 
b.  Now, in 2009, the situation has changed.   Continued demands from 
American congressmen that China should stop intervening in foreign 
exchange market to keep the RMB fixed against the dollar have become 
especially foolish.  This is because of two developments over the last year. 
i.  The first development: in the spring of 2008, the top leaders in 
China decided to jettison the policy they had followed in 2007 – 
which had consisted of the long-desired abandonment of the dollar 
peg and the placing of a substantial weight on the euro.   They 
changed horses in mid-stream:    After mid-2008 they returned to 
their old policy (e.g., 2005-06) of a fairly close peg to the dollar.   
Evidently the motivation for the return to the dollar was complaints 
from Chinese exporters who had lost competitiveness in 2007, as 
the euro and therefore the new basket appreciated against the 
dollar.
12  
ii.  Why, then, are American congressmen wrong to complain that the 
return of the dollar link has given American firms an additional 
price disadvantage in world markets?   The first reason on the list 
is that over the last year, the euro (surprisingly) depreciated against 
the euro.  In other words, at precisely the moment when the RMB 
jumped back on the dollar horse, the dollar horse and the euro 
horse changed direction vis-à-vis each other.  If the Chinese 
authorities had kept the loose basket policy of 2007 instead of 
switching back to the dollar peg in 2008, the value of the RMB 
would be lower today, not higher, and dollar-based producers 
would be at a greater competitive disadvantage, not lower. 
iii.  The second development is that, in early 2009, the stratospheric 
rate of rise of China’s foreign exchange reserves fell abruptly.  In a 
couple of months, the PBoC even lost reserves.   This means that 
an increase in exchange rate flexibility – in the extreme case, a 
move to floating – under current conditions might not result in an 
                                                 
12 Barry Naughton (2008) and Melton (2009) give a glimpse inside politburo politics.   appreciation of the RMB, and might even result in a depreciation.  
Again, that does not correspond to what the congressmen really 
want, nor to the public sentiment that they represent. 
iv.  True, in the near future we could well see a return of substantial 
surpluses on China’s overall balance of payments and a return of 
the 38-year trend dollar depreciation.   In that case, non-
intervention would once again imply RMB appreciation against the 
dollar.  But that leads us to the third point. 
v.  The third development, in the spring of 2009, are the appearance in 
the dollar’s garden of the first “red shoots.”   Red as in deficits and 
red as in China.   For decades, the United States has been able to 
count on foreigner investors, and in a pinch foreign central banks 
more specifically, to buy dollars to finance US deficits.   In recent 
years, the PBoC has been the lead facilitator, piling up $2 trillion 
in reserves, most of it in dollars.   During the spring of 2009 we 
have seen the first signals that this process might not continue 
forever.   At long last, the possibility that rating agencies might 
eventually downgrade US debt is in the air, and longer-term 
interest rates have risen over the last month.    
vi.  But the most telling warning shots have come from Chinese 
officials.   Premier Wen in April expressed worry that US Treasury 
securities would lose value in the future, requiring an 
unprecedented public reassurance from President Obama.   PBoC 
Governor Zhou in May proposed replacing the dollar as an 
international currency, with the SDR.   Another official told 
Americans that his countrymen “hate” having to hold a currency 
that they believe will lose value in the future as it has in the past.  
Interpreted separately and literally, each of these statements raises 
interesting economic questions worthy of extended discussion.  
Taken together, they constitute a wake-up call for oblivious 
congressmen.   The message is that, at a time when its ratio of debt 
to GDP is on an explosive path, the United States is heavily and 
increasingly dependent on China to buy its treasury bills.   If they 
and other Asian and commodity-exporting countries stop buying 
US treasury bills, the result would almost certainly be a hard 
landing for the dollar, defined as the combination of a big fall in 
the value of the dollar together with a big increase in US interest 
rates.  
vii.  As a general proposition, it is obtuse to make strident demands on 
ones’ biggest creditor without taking any consideration of the 
change in power that debtor status entails.   It is astoundingly 
obtuse to make the demand that the Chinese stop buying dollars, at 
the same time as the United States is dependent on them 
continuing to buy dollars to finance our deficits.     US Treasury 
Secretary Geithner appears to have recognized this reality, judging 
by the tenor of his June trip to China.  
Part II:  What’s “In”? 
 
1.  G-20 
If the G-7 group of finance ministers and G-8 group of leaders are “out,” what is 
“in”?   The G-20.    The meeting of the G-20 in London in April had some substantive 
successes and some failures.   It appears likely that there was turning point, that the larger 
group will now be the central focus, thereby finally giving major developing/emerging 
countries some representation.   If so, that is the most important thing that happened at 
the meeting 
 
2.  IMF 
Perhaps the second most important thing that happened at the London meeting of the 
G-20 was the decision to triple in size the IMF.  Recall that a few short years ago, the 
conventional wisdom is that the Fund no longer had a job to do in fighting crises, and that 
it was in danger of irrelevance.    As a result, the staff was cut back sharply, with the full 
effects coming just as the international financial crisis started in 2007.      Now the IMF is 
once again busy, new staff are being hired, and the membership has decided to increase 
its resources. 
 
3.  SDR 
The comeback of the IMF was predictable.    Far more surprising is the comeback 
from near-oblivion of the SDR (Special Drawing Right) as a potential international 
money.     
a.  According to a useful 2x3 chart used by Kenen (1983), shown in Table 2, 
each of the three classical functions of money has two dimensions.    The 
store of value function can be either official (central bank reserve 
holdings) or private (portfolios of individual investors).    The unit of 
account function can also be either official (an anchor for smaller 
currencies) or private (use in denominating bonds, and so forth).    Finally, 
the medium of exchange function too, can be either official (foreign 
exchange intervention) or private (invoicing of trade and financial 
transactions).   
 
   Table 3: Roles of an International Currency 
Function of 
money: 
Governments Private  actors 
 
Store of value  International reserves  Currency substitution 
(private dollarization) 
Medium of 
exchange 
Vehicle currency for foreign 
exchange intervention 
Invoicing trade and 
financial transactions 
Unit of account  Anchor for pegging local 
currency 
Denominating trade and 
financial transactions 
   b.  The SDR came into being at the end of the 1960s as a too-late medicine 
for the rapidly-deteriorating Bretton Woods patient.    The SDRs issued in 
the early 1970s established its claim as an international reserve asset,
13  
but the quantities were far too small by modern standards to matter for 
anything.   For a time, discretely encouraged by the IMF, the SDR was 
used by some countries to peg their currencies and others to issue bonds.   
Already by 1996, however, the SDR had failed to perform well in any of 
the dimensions of an international currency.   From time to time, authors 
would respond to an international liquidity shortage by proposing a new 
issue of SDRs, but they were usually dismissed as unrealistic politically. 
c.  Unexpectedly, at the London meeting in April 2009, the G-20 decided to 
create new SDRs.   It was shortly later that the Chinese central bank 
proposed the possibility of replacing the dollar as lead international 
currency with the SDR.  Some have revived the proposal for an 
international substitution account at the IMF, which would extinguish an 
unwanted dollar overhang in exchange for SDRs.  Some major region or 
country, like China itself, would have to adopt the SDR as its home 
currency – an unlikely event – before it stood much chance of standing up 
as a competitor to the euro or yen, let alone to the dollar.  Nonetheless, the 
SDR is suddenly back in the game as a factor in the world monetary 
system. 
 
4.  Credit cycle 
For 30 years, monetary economics held that excessive monetary expansion was 
synonymous with inflation getting out of control, necessitating monetary contraction and, 
usually, a recession, to get back to stability.   In truth, this cycle did fit fairly well the 
recessions of 1974, 1980, 1981-82, and 1990-91.   Forgotten was an earlier notion of 
cyclicality:  the credit cycle of von Hayek, the bubbles and panics of Kindleberger, the 
Minsky moment, and Irving Fisher’s debt deflation. 
As some econmoists at the Bank for International Settlements (Borio, 2005, and 
White, 2009) pointed out ahead of the current crisis, the 20
th century is replete with 
examples of big asset booms that ended in devastating crashes, where monetary policy in 
retrospect was too easy during the boom phase, and yet where inflation did not show up 
at any stage:    the 1920s real estate boom in Florida and stock market boom in New 
York, followed by the 1929 crash and Great Depression;  the 1986-89 stock market and 
real estate bubbles in Japan followed by the decade of stagnation; and the subsequent 
East Asia boom and bust in the 1990s.   The US experience of the last decade fits this 
pattern well.    Now Alan Greenspan can be answered:  (i) yes, identifying bubbles is 
hard, but no harder than identifying inflationary pressures 18 months ahead of time; (ii) 
monetary authorities do actually have tools to prick speculative bubbles, and; (iii) the 
habit of coming to the rescue of the markets after the crash created a moral hazard 
problem (the “Greenspan put”) which exacerbated the bubbles in the first place; and (iv) 
                                                 
13 Some important observers do not consider the SDR a money or an asset, but rather a line of credit.   
Although he is willing to be convinced otherwise, the author’s view is that the SDR is as fundamentally an 
asset like any other fiat money.  The name “right” was an attempt to console the French, for losing the fight 
over whether it was to be an asset, by choosing a name that suggested the opposite of the actual outcome. the cost in terms of lost output can be enormous, even when the central bank eases very 
aggressively. 
  Thus we have yet another reason why central banks should not focus exclusively 
on inflation.   Perhaps the credit cycle even provides the long-lost rationale for the ECB’s 
continued insistence on placing the M1 pillar on the same pedestal as the inflation pillar ! 
 
5.  Reserves 
The number of floating currencies has steadily increased, ever since 1973.    For 
many emerging markets, the increase in exchange rate flexibility was a response – 
sometimes deliberate and planned, sometimes forced and unplanned – to the crises of 
1994-2001.    In theory, countries that float should not need to hold reserves, let alone to 
use them.   Yet developing and emerging market countries took advantage of the boom of 
2003-2007 to build up their reserves to unheard of heights.   Instead of choosing between 
greater exchange rate flexibility and higher reserves, they chose both. 
 
a.  Western economists delivered some persuasive-sounding papers and 
speeches suggesting that many of the countries were holding far more 
reserves than they needed.
14   After all, most of these reserves were held in 
the form of US Treasury bills, which earned low returns, because of both 
low US Treasury bill rates and trend depreciation of the dollar.  The 
implication was that central banks in developing countries should (i) allow 
more appreciation and less reserve accumulation, (ii) for whatever level of 
reserves they continue to hold, diversify them.     
b.  With the coming of the international financial crisis, however, it appears 
that the emerging market countries knew their business better than we 
academic economists.   Aizenman (2009), for example, concludes that the 
global liquidity crisis has now illustrated that foreign exchange reserves 
provide important self insurance.
15   Similarly, Obstfeld, Shambaugh, 
Taylor (2009) conclude that those countries which built up large 
precautionary holdings of reserves after the East Asia crisis of the late 
1990s were doing the right thing:  They find that the level of reserve 
holdings (relative to a measure of need based on M2) was a statistically 
significant predictor of which countries were then able to avoid large 
depreciations in the “Panic of 2008.”   Perhaps reserve accumulation is a 
useful way of making sure that windfall gains in export revenue get saved 
for a rainy day in countries where the central bank may be the only 
institution that is resistant to political pressure.    
 
6.  Intermediate exchange rate regimes 
If the corners hypothesis is “out,” as indicated under concept 3 of Part I, then it 
follows that intermediate regimes are back “in.”    Intermediate regimes include 
the following:  target zones (bands), crawls, basket pegs, and adjustable pegs, and 
                                                 
14 Especially Jeanne (2007), Rodrik (2006) and Summers (2006). 
15 “The deleveraging triggered by the crisis implies that countries that hoarded reserves have been reaping 
the benefits.” various combinations of them.
16  The IMF classifies more than half of its 
members as following regimes somewhere in between free float and hard peg.   
Economists’ attempts to estimate the de facto regimes that countries actually 
follow generally estimate an even higher fraction of intermediate regimes.     
a.  But this leads us to the point that the various attempts to discern what 
countries are actually doing (de facto classification) disagree with each 
other as much as they disagree with the de jure classification.
17    I would 
suggest three limitations of the methodologies used, which may help 
explain this inconvenient lack of congruence.   First, many of the methods 
do not attempt to distinguish whether high exchange rate variability is 
attributed to high shocks or to a high propensity to allow a given shock to 
show up in the exchange rate rather than in reserves.  It matters, because 
shocks are in fact much higher for some economies than others.   Second, 
many of the methods do not attempt to allow the anchor currency, or 
currency basket, to be estimated endogenously, and instead impose an 
assumed anchor, usually the dollar.  This matters because some currencies 
have other anchors, such as baskets.   Third, most of the methods do not 
attempt to allow endogenously for parameters to change frequently.  This 
matters because most currencies follow regimes that evolve rapidly. 
b.  I have recently proposed a new approach to estimate countries’ de facto 
exchange rate regimes, a synthesis of two techniques.
18  One is a 
technique that I have used in the past to estimate the implicit de facto 
weights (by OLS regression on exchange rate changes).
19   Here the 
hypothesis is a basket peg with little flexibility.  The second is a technique 
used by others to estimate the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility 
(by observing the outcome of exchange market pressure).  Here the 
hypothesis is an anchor to the dollar or some other single major currency, 
but with a possibly substantial degree of flexibility around that anchor.
20   
It is important to have available a technique that can cover both 
dimensions, inferring weights and flexibility.   
c.  We have tried out the synthesis equation on some 20 currencies over the 
period since 1980.  In general the equation seems to work as it should, 
whether for basket pegs, dollar pegs, and floaters.  I have now tried it out 
on recent data for the most prominent case of a disputed exchange rate 
regime:   the case of the Chinese RMB, where it produced the results 
asserted under subsection 8 of part I. 
21    
d.  Real world data demand a statistical technique that allows parameters that 
evolve more often than once a year.  Chile, for example, followed a 
band+basket+crawl in the 1980s and 1990s that was exceptionally 
transparent, but that included 18 announced changes in parameters (width, 
                                                 
16  E.g., Williamson (2001). 
17  As measured either by correlation statistics or by percentage of matches in classification.  E.g., Frankel 
(2003). 
18 Frankel and Wei (2008). 
19 E.g., Frankel and Wei (1994). 
20 Calvo and Reinhart (2002),    Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) . 
21 Frankel (2009b). weights, level, and crawl).  The usual techniques cannon handle such 
frequent parameter shifts.  Accordingly I have recently acquired weekly 
reserve data for some countries (and am interpolating for some other 
countries, where only monthly reserve data are available).  I am applying 
econometric techniques that allow endogenous estimation of parameter 
breakpoints.   
 
Table 4: Identifying Parameter Break Points Endogenously 
in Estimation of China’s Exchange Rate Regime  
With weekly data set 
(In this case, interpolations are made to get weekly reserve data from monthly.) 
Δ(EMP) defined as [Δ res(t)]/mb(t-1)+[ Δ exr(t)]/exr(t-1) 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)         (6) 
VARIABLES 1/6/2005-
7/15/2005 
7/29/2005-
4/27/2007 
5/4/2007-
11/16/2007 
11/23/2007-
9/8/2008 
9/15/2008-
12/8/2008 
12/15/2008- 
3/11/2009 
          
US $  1.000*** 0.893***  0.596***  0.685***  0.965***  0.929*** 
(0.000) (0.030)  (0.101)  (0.066)  (0.091)  (0.058) 
Euro  0.000 0.046*  0.087  0.241***  0.128  0.037 
(0.000) (0.025)  (0.077)  (0.050)  (0.082)  (0.049) 
Jp yen  -0.000 0.014 0.063  0.059**  -0.065**  0.010 
(0.000) (0.013)  (0.038)  (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.021) 
Δ emp  0.000 0.034  0.129**  0.185***  0.165  0.042 
(0.000) (0.024)  (0.060)  (0.052)  (0.125)  (0.063) 
Constant -0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Observations 28 92  29  42  13  13 
Kr won -0.000 0.047 0.254  0.015  -0.027  0.023 
R-squared 1.000 0.979  0.929  0.990  0.999  0.999 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   (Robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
7.  Commodity currencies 
In the 1990s, heavy bulky commodities (agricultural and mineral products) were out, 
and weightless internet technology was in.  But commodities have made a comeback.    
a.  A few countries with commodity-concentrated exports are floaters.   They 
include Australia, Canada, Chile, and South Africa.    They have 
“commodity currencies,” in the sense that they tend to experience 
appreciation when the world market for their export commodities is 
strong, as during 2001-08, and depreciation when it is weak, as in the 
1990s and late 2008.
22     
 
Table 5:  Determination of South Africa’s Real Exchange Rate based on CPI 
 
                                                 
22 Among other examples:  Chen and Rogoff (2003) for Australia and New Zealand, and Frankel (2007a) 
for South Africa. Dependent Variable: Log(Real Rand CPI) 
Sample(adjusted): 1984:II-2007:I 
92 observations, after adjusting endpoints 
 
Variable Coefficient
estimate 
Std. 
Error
t-
Statistic
Prob.  
Log(Real Rand CPI (-1))  0.839  0.043 19.687  0.0000 
Log(Real World Mineral Price Index) 0.164  0.058 2.816  0.006 
Real Interest Differential  0.018  0.005 3.390  0.0011 
Cap Lib Dummy  -0.050  0.023 -2.154  0.0341 
Cap Lib Dummy * RID  -0.009  0.006 -1.468  0.1457 
C 0.738  0.202 3.652  0.0004 
R-squared   0.912                
Adjusted R-squared  0.907        S.D. dependent var  0.213 
S.E. of regression  0.065        F-statistic    178.6 
Sum squared resid  0.363        Prob(F-statistic)   0.000 
Log likelihood    124.05        Durbin-Watson stat  1.718       
 
 
 
 
The Rand, 1984-2006:
Fundamentals (real commodity prices,
real interest differential, country risk premium, & l.e.v.)
can explain the real appreciation of 2003-06 – Frankel ( 2007).
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b.   Other commodity producers have fixed exchange rates, for example Saudi 
Arabia and the other oil-producers of the Gulf, who welcome the stable 
anchor and the facilitation of international transactions from their dollar pegs.    When oil prices soar however, the export earnings show up as an 
inflow of money and inflation, since they can’t show up as an appreciation 
of the currency.   When oil prices crash, reserves run low and the currency 
is vulnerable to a crash, and with it the entire economy (e.g., Indonesia 
and Russia in 1998).  Clearly both regimes have advantages:  the anchor 
provided by a fixed exchange rate and the accommodation of terms of 
trade shocks by a floating exchange rate.    The claim for my Peg the 
Export Price proposal
23, which would peg the currency to oil, or the more 
moderate version, Peg the Export Price Index
24, is that it would give the 
best of both worlds. 
 
 
8.  Multiple reserve currency system 
In Part I, Section 6(g) reported a statistical exercise predicting that the euro could rise 
to challenge the dollar as international currency over the coming decade.   In Part II, 
Section 3 remarked on the sudden come-back of the SDR from near-oblivion.   The 
financial turbulence of the last year has enhanced the safe haven status of the yen.  
Meanwhile gold has also made a sudden comeback among as a form in which central 
banks hold international reserve assets, after years in which scholars and central bankers 
alike considered its continuing presence in their vaults to be an historical anachronism.  
Finally, though it would take years of developing and opening China’s financial markets, 
the RMB could well be an international currency ten years from now, and on of those at 
the top 30 years from now.   We just may be headed for a system of multiple reserve 
currencies. 
a.  A multiple reserve currency system is inefficient, in the same sense that a 
barter economy is inefficient:   money was invented in the first place to cut 
down on the transactions costs of exchange, to avoid the need for a 
“double coincidence of wants.”  
b.  Nevertheless, if sound macroeconomic policies in the leader country 
cannot be presumed, the existence of some competitor currencies gives the 
rest of the world protection against the leader exploiting its position by 
running up too much debt and then inflating/depreciating it away. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23  Frankel and Saiki (2002). 
24  Frankel (2005). References 
 
 
Aizenman, Joshua, 2009, “On the Paradox of Prudential Regulations in the Globalized Economy: 
International Reserves and the Crisis – A Reassessment,”  NBER Working Paper No. 14779, March.     
 
Bernanke, Ben, Thomas Laubach, Frederic Mishkin, and Adam Posen (1999),  Inflation Targeting: Lessons 
from the International Experience, Princeton University Press: Princeton NJ, 1999. 
Borio, Claudio,  2005, “Monetary and Financial Stability: So Close and Yet So Far?” National Institute 
Economic Review, Vol. 192, No. 1, 84-101. 
Caballero, Ricardo, Emmanuel Farhi and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, "An Equilibrium Model of ‘Global 
Imbalances’ and Low Interest Rates," NBER Working Paper 11996; American Economic Review, 98(1),  
358-93, March 2008. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo, and Carmen Reinhart, 2002, “Fear of Floating” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 
no. 2, May,  379-408. 
 
Chen, Yu-Chin, and Kenneth Rogoff,  2003, “Commodity Currencies and Empirical Exchange Rate 
Puzzles”  Journal of International Economics, Volume 60, Issue 1, May, Pages 133-160, 
 
Chinn, Menzie, and Jeffrey Frankel, 2007, “Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar as Leading 
International Reserve Currency?”  in G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment, 
edited by Richard Clarida (University of Chicago Press: Chicago). 
 
 __ “Why the Euro Will Rival the Dollar,” International Finance 11, no. 1, 2008, 49-73. 
 
Clarida, Richard, 2005, “The Euro and Prospects for Policy Coordination: Comment,” in The Euro at Five: 
Ready for a Global Role? Special Report 18, edited by Adam Posen (Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, DC). 
 
Cline, William, 2005, The United States as a Debtor Nation (Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC).  
 
Cooper, Richard, “Living with Global Imbalances: A Contrarian View,” Policy Briefs in International 
Economics, Institute for International Economics, November 2005. 
 
Devereux, Michael, and Alan Sutherland, “Valuation Effects and the Dynamics of Net External Assets,”  
NBER Working Paper No. 14794, March 2009.       
 
Dominguez, Kathryn and Jeffrey Frankel, 1993,  Does Foreign Exchange Intervention Work?, Institute for 
International Economics, Washington, D.C. 
 
The Economist. 1999. “Global Finance: Time for a Redesign?” January 30:1-18. 
 
Eichengreen, Barry. 1994. International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century, Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution.  
 
———. 1999. Toward a New Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda, Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics. 
 
Eichengreen, Barry, and Jeffrey Frankel, 1996, "The SDR, Reserve Currencies, and the Future of the 
International Monetary System," in The Future of the SDR in Light of Changes in the International Financial System, edited by Michael Mussa, James Boughton, and Peter Isard, eds. International Monetary 
Fund. 
Feldstein, Martin, "A More Competitive Dollar is Good for America," Financial Times, Oct. 15, 2007.   
Fischer, Stanley. 2001 . “Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 15(2): 3-24. 
 
Forbes, Kristin, 2008, “Why Do Foreigners Invest in the United States?”  NBER Working Paper No. 
13908, April. 
 
Frankel, Jeffrey, 2003, "Experience of and Lessons from Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging 
Economies," written for the Asian Development Bank, in a study coordinated by Takatoshi Ito and Yung 
Chul Park. In Monetary and Financial Cooperation in East Asia, Macmillan Press.  
 
--  2005, “Peg the Export Price Index: A Proposed Monetary Regime for Small Countries,”    Journal of 
Policy Modeling, vol. 27, issue 4, June, pp. 495-508. 
 
-- 2006a, “On the Yuan: The Choice Between Adjustment Under a Fixed Exchange Rate and Adjustment 
under a Flexible Rate,”  in Understanding the Chinese Economy, edited by Gerhard Illing, CESifo 
Economic Studies, vol. 52, no. 2 (Oxford University Press), 246-275. 
 
-- 2006b "Could the Twin Deficits Jeopardize US Hegemony?" Journal of Policy Modeling, vol. 28, no.6, 
Sept. 2006, pp. 653-663. 
 
--- 2007a, “On the Rand: Determinants of the South African Exchange Rate,” South African Journal of 
Economics, vol.75, no.3, September 2007, 425-441 
 
-- , 2007b, “Nine Reasons We Are Given Not to Worry About the US Deficits,” workshop on Global  
Trends and Challenges, Commission on Growth and Development, chaired by Michael Spence.   
 
__  2008, "Estimation of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes:  Synthesis of The Techniques for Inferring 
Flexibility and Basket Weights,"  IMF Staff Papers, vol. 55.   
 
--, 2009a, “The Estimated Effects of the Euro on Trade:   Why Are They Below Historical Effects of 
Monetary Unions Among Smaller Countries?” Europe and the Euro, Milan; Alberto Alesina and Francesco 
Giavazzi, eds., forthcoming, University of Chicago Press.  NBER WP No. 14542. 
 
-- 2009b, “New Estimation of China’s Exchange Rate Regime,”  Forthcoming, Pacific Economic Review  
(Wiley InterScience, Blackwell Publishing). 
 
Frankel, Jeffrey, and Ayako Saiki, 2002, “A Proposal to Anchor Monetary Policy by the Price of the Export 
Commodity,” Journal of Economic Integration, September, 17, no.3, pp. 417-448. 
 
Frankel, Jeffrey and Shang-Jin Wei, 1994, "Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? Exchange Rate Policies of the East 
Asian Economies" , in Macroeconomic Linkages: Savings, Exchange Rates, and Capital Flows, Takatoshi 
Ito and Anne Krueger, editors, University of Chicago Press. 
 
--, 2008, "Estimation of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes:  Synthesis of  The Techniques for Inferring 
Flexibility and Basket Weights,"   IMF Staff Papers. 
 
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier and Helene Rey, "From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist: U.S. 
External Adjustment and the Exorbitant Privilege,” in G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability and 
Adjustment, edited by Richard Clarida,  11-66. 
 Hausmann, Ricardo, and Federico Sturzenegger, 2006a, " Global Imbalances or Bad Accounting? The 
Missing Dark Matter in the Wealth of Nations" CID Working Paper No. 124, Harvard University. 
--  2006b,  The Implications of Dark Matter for Assessing the US External Imbalance" CID Working Paper 
No. 137,  Harvard University. 
Jeanne, Olivier, 2007, “International Reserves in Emerging Market Countries: Too Much of a Good 
Thing?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, W. C. Brainard and G. L. Perry eds., pp. 1-
55(Brookings Institution, Washington DC). 
Ju, Jiandong, and Shang-Jin Wei, 2008, “When Is Quality of Financial System a Source of Comparative 
Advantage?” WP No. 13984, May. 
 
Kenen, Peter, 1983,  The Role of the Dollar as an International Currency, Occasional Paper no. 13, Group 
of Thirty: New York.  
 
Lane, Philip, and Gian-Maria Milesi Feretti, “A Global Perspective on External Positions,”  NBER 
Working Paper No. 11589; in G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment, Clarida, 
University of Chicago Press, 2007, pages 67-10. 
 
Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo, and Federico Sturzenegger, 2003, “To Float or to Trail: Evidence on the Impact of 
Exchange Rate Regimes,”. American Economic Review, 93, No. 4, Sept.  
 
Melton, Oliver, 2009, “Confronting China’s Current Account Surplus,” Second Year Policy Analysis, 
MPA/International Development, Harvard Kennedy School, May. 
 
Meltzer, Alan, 2000, Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission. Submitted to 
the US Congress and US Department of the Treasury, March 8. 
 
Mendoza, Enrico, Vincenzo Quadrini, and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, 2007a, “Financial Integration, Financial 
Deepness and Global Imbalances,” NBER Working Paper No. 12909. February 2007. 
 
-- 2007b, "On the Welfare Implications of Financial Globalization without Financial Development," NBER 
Working Paper 13412. 
 
Minton-Beddoes, Zanny. 1999. From EMU to AMU? The Case for Regional Currency Blocs. Foreign 
Affairs. Vol. 78. 
 
Naughton, Barry, 2008, “A New Team Faces Unprecedented Economic Challenges,” China Leadership 
Monitor, No. 26. 
 
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1995. “The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates,”  Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 9, no.4 (Fall):73-96. 
 
Obstfeld, Maurice, Jay Shambaugh, Alan Taylor , 2009, “Financial Instability, Reserves, and Central Bank 
Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008,” NBER Working Paper No. 14826, March. 
 
Rodrik, Dani, “The Social Cost of Foreign Exchange Reserves,” International Economic Journal. Vol. 20, 
no. 3, September 2006, pp. 253 – 266.   NBER WP No. 11952. 
 
Rose, Andrew K., 2000, “One Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on 
Trade,” Economic Policy, Vol. 15, No. 30 (April), pp. 8–45 
 
Summers, Lawrence. 1999. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International 
Economic Policy and Export/Trade Promotion, January 27.  
Summers, Lawrence, 2006, “Reflections on Global Account Imbalances and Emerging Markets Reserve 
Accumulation,” L.K. Jha Memorial Lecture, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, March 24. 
 
Svensson, Lars, 1995, “The Swedish Experience of an Inflation Target,” in Inflation Targets, edited by Leo 
Leiderman and Lars Svensson (Centre for Economic Policy Research: London). 
 
Truman, Edwin (2003) Inflation Targeting in the World Economy, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC. 
White, William, 2009, “Should Monetary Policy ‘Lean or Clean’?” Center for Financial Studies, Goethe 
University Frankfurt, May 27. 
 
Williamson, John, 2001, “The Case for a Basket, Band and Crawl (BBC) Regime for East Asia,” D. Gruen 
and J. Simon, eds., Future Directions for Monetary Policies in East Asia, Reserve Bank of Australia, 97-
109. 
 